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Abstract
Khaleghian  studies the Impact of political  the two groups. In the  low-income group, development
decentralization  on childhood  immunization,  an essential  assistance  reduces the  gains from decentralization.  In the
public  service provided  in almost all countries.  He  middle-income group, democratic  government mitigates
examines the relationship empirically  using a time-series  the negative effects  of decentralization,  and
data set of 140 low- and middle-income countries from  decentralization  reverses the negative  effects of ethnic
1980 to  1997. The author finds that decentralization  has  tension and ethno-linguistic  fractionalization,  but
different effects  in low- and middle-income  countries.  In  institutional quality  and literacy rates have  no interactive
the low-income  group, decentralized  countries have  effect either way.  Similar results are obtained whether
higher coverage rates than centralized  ones, with an  decentralization  is measured with a dichotomous
average difference  of 8.5 percent for measles and DTP3  categorical  variable or with more specific measures  of
vaccines.  In the middle-income group,  the reverse  effect  fiscal  decentralization.  The study confirms predictions in
is observed:  decentralized countries have lower coverage  the theoretical  literature about the negative impact of
rates than  centralized ones, with an average difference  of  local political  control on services that have  public goods
5.2 percent for the same vaccines.  Both  results are  characteristics  and inter-jurisdictional  externalities.  The
significant at the 99 percent level.  Modifiers of the  author discusses reasons for the difference  between  low-
decentralization-immunization  relationship also differ in  and middle-income countries.
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Decentralization  has become an increasingly familiar theme in development
theory and practice over the past two decades. Yet the literature on decentralization  has
tended to concentrate  on case  studies and theoretical  discussions rather than empirical
analysis,  and few studies have explored the practical consequences  of decentralization
policies in a quantitative way. The purpose of the present study is to empirically test the
impact of decentralization on an essential public  service provided in all countries-
childhood immunization-and to see if the various benefits proposed for decentralization
are, in practice,  seen. Given the continued interest in decentralization in developing
countries, the findings  are expected to be of interest to those in the development  ,
community as well  as to health specialists  concerned specifically with immunization.
Examining the impact of decentralization  on immunization  services has several
objectives. First, examining the decentralization-immunization  relationship  can help
health planners and policymakers to predict the likely consequences of decentralizing
processes-most of which originate  as political decisions outside the health sector-on
immunization  and similar services (such as family planning or maternal and child health)
within the health sector. Decentralization  has featured prominently  in health sector reform
efforts  in many countries,  and there has been considerable  discussion of its potential to
negatively affect health services such as immunization and family planning
(Kolehmainen-Aitken and Newbrander  1997; Melgaard  1998; Feilden and Neilson 2001;
POLICY Project 2001). For example, a WHO conference on health reform and
immunization  in  1999 devoted the majority of its report to the consequences of
decentralization  (WHO  1999). Published case studies of national immunization  and
family planning programs have also given prominence to the effect of decentralization  on
these services (Msambichaka  1998; Fielden and others  1999; POLICY  Project 2001). As
a rule, these studies have used case studies, qualitative methods and managerial indicators
to examine  the impact of decentralization.  The aim of the present study is to complement
these works by using a quantitative approach  to measure the approximate extent to which
decentralization  affects the delivery of immunization services,  as well as to explore some
of the channels through which it works.
Second, if immunization is accepted as a proxy for other (similar) public services,
the analysis can illuminate the broader effects of decentralization  on public service
provision as a whole. Immunization  has a number of unique characteristics,  so its use as a
proxy for all public services is not without shortcomings. But given the ready availability
of data on immunization coverage,  and the reasonable  quality and comparability of these
data across time and space, they nevertheless provide a useful lens through which to
examine the impact of decentralization policies in a quantitative  and comparative way.
Caution is required when generalizing such findings, except perhaps  to similar services
such as malaria control or maternal and child health: but the exercise can nonetheless
provide helpful insights into the effects of decentralization  and a platform for testing
1some of the theoretical benefits proposed for it. This study therefore contributes  to a
small but emerging  literature that uses quantitative  analysis to examine the impact of
decentralization on public services, examples of which include Bird, Ebel and Wallich
(1995), West and Wong (1995), Isham and Kahkonen (1999), Akin, Hutchinson, and
Strumpf (2001) and Faguet (2001).
2.  Definitions
For the purposes of this paper, decentralization  is defined as the presence of
taxing, spending or regulatory authority on the part of subnational authorities such as
state, provincial,  district or municipal  governments. Deconcentration  of the health sector
(also known as "administrative"  or "ministerial" decentralization)  is not included,  since
our primary question is about the implications of political decentralization  rather than the
organizational  arrangements within a given sector'; neither is democratic participation a
necessary precondition, though it tends to accompany decentralization  in most cases.2
The definition draws from Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984) and is equivalent  to
what their paper calls "devolution."  We use the more general term "decentralization"  to
simplify comparisons with its opposite, "centralization."  The definition also corresponds
to the definition used in Beck and colleagues'  (2000) Database of Political Institutions,
on which the quantitative analysis below is based.
Since many countries have deconcentrated  their health systems,  excluding this
from our definition would seem to miss a point of policy importance: namely, what
happens when ministries of health move their operations closer to the field. This issue,
while important,  is quite distinct from the question of decentralization proper
(devolution). Decentralization and deconcentration differ in both their origins and their
content.  The former is a political reform designed to reduce  the extent of central
influence and promote local autonomy instead, while the latter is an administrative
reform that can actually strengthen central control over peripheral  areas. Our interest in
this study is in the former reform and its implications,  not the latter,  though fruitful
insights might be gained  from a study of that issue also.3
' As used in this paper, the term "decentralized  health system" therefore refers  to health systems
operating in a decentralized (devolved)  political environment, and not to deconcentrated health systems.
2 Democracy does not invariably  accompany decentralization.  China, Mauritania,  Sudan, the United
Arab Emirates, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe are all non-democratic countries  where
subnational polities have taxing, spending or regulatory authority. The correlation  coefficient for the
democracy and decentralization  variables  in our data is only 0.47,  implying a positive but weak correlation.
3 Deconcentration  has been described as "centralization  in disguise,"  since it extends the geographic
and policy reach of the central government with no guarantee that community participation, accountability,
innovation, or any of the other proposed benefits of decentralization  will materialize. Case studies  in the
health sector have highlighted these weaknesses (Campos-Outcalt,  Kewa, and Thomason  1995; Jeppson
and Okuonzi 2000). On the other hand, deconcentration  has been proposed  as a way of getting the "best of
both worlds."  Like devolution, it brings government "closer" to the community  and facilitates  access to
local  information; but it also preserves the consistency and parsimony of centralized decisionmaking and it
maintains  the relative ease of centralized policy implementation.  In the absence of good cross-national  data
2Many studies have used data on subnational expenditures  as their sole measure of
the extent of decentralization  (see, for example, Davoodi  and Zou 1998; Fisman and Gatti
1999; Robalino, Picazo, and Voetberg 2001). We depart from this tradition for two
reasons:  first, because data on subnational  expenditures, while providing a tangible and
useful indicator of the spending dimension of decentralization,  do not capture its taxing
or regulatory aspects; and second, because these data may provide a misleading account
of the actual autonomy of subnational polities, such as when the composition of local
expenditures is determined by the central government and is only nominally under local
government control (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002). Expenditure data, being continuous in
nature, more accurately reflect the fact that decentralization  is not an "all-or-nothing"
phenomenon,  and that countries exist along a continuum of reform (Hurley, Birch and
Eyles 1995; Mills  1994; Smith 1997).  This aspect is not captured by the dichotomous
definition used here:  but the greater comprehensiveness  and theoretical  consistency of the
present definition provide some compensation. Our empirical  analysis uses both variables
for comparison.
3.  Decentralization  and public services
Many of the proposed benefits of decentralization  are based on the premise that it
brings local decisionmakers  closer to the constituencies  they serve. Implicit in this are
assumptions  about the nature of information available to local decisionmakers, the
presence of effective  channels for the public to express wants and preferences,  and the
incentive environment motivating decisionmakers to respond. Each of these assumptions
leads to specific conclusions regarding the benefits of decentralization;  and taken
together, the resulting argument is compelling:  local decisionmakers  have access to better
information on local circumstances  than central authorities, and they use this to tailor
services and spending patterns to local needs and preferences; the public provides input
to local decisionmaking  processes and holds local decisionmakers  accountable for their
actions; and administrative autonomy creates space for learning, innovation, community
participation  and the adaptation  of public services to local circumstances. Classical
descriptions  of the benefits of decentralization typically follow one or more of these
strands (see, for example, Tiebout 1956 and Musgrave  1959).4
Most of these assumptions are open to question, however, especially in
developing countries. Local authorities, while advantaged by access to information on
local circumstances, may be disadvantaged by a lack of access to technical information or
to the expert individuals required to interpret it. Channels for the public to express their
wants and preferences may be ineffective-and  the institutional capacity and incentives
for local decisionmakers  to respond may be weak anyway-so  accountability and
participation  may remain unchanged.  And local administrative autonomy, while
providing scope for innovation, learning and local adaptation, might just as easily lead to
on health system deconcentration,  we were not able to examine these differences empirically in the present
study.
4 Azfar  and colleagues (1999)  provide an excellent summary of this literature.
3interest group capture of the decisionmaking process, inadequate attention to equity,
inter-jurisdictional  free riding, and neglect of public goods. These outcomes, where they
occur, can be explained by a variety of theoretical concerns,  design-related  issues, and
social, cultural and political factors.
Bardhan  and Mookherjee  (1998), using a theoretical model of public service
provision under decentralized and centralized  governments,  find that decentralization
perfonns poorly when local authorities are prone to elite capture (inter alia  a function of
elite group preferences  for the good or service in question), when inter-jurisdictional
externalities  are significant, and when local authorities lack access to necessary
information.  Besley and Coate (1999), also using a theoretical model, find that
decentralization  performs better in the presence of inter-jurisdictional  heterogeneities (of
language or culture, for example)  and worse for goods or services with inter-
jurisdictional spillovers (externalities).  Paul (1991)  discusses constraints  to the use of
voice and exit mechanisms-both  being theoretical  determinants of the accountability
and efficiency benefits of decentralized systems-and points to legal and institutional
barriers, informational asymmetries,  income and education-related  factors as constraints
to the use of voice, and legal barriers, spatial barriers, monopolistic provision and public
good characteristics  as constraints  to the use of exit.5 Using detailed studies of
decentralization  and public service delivery in Uganda and the Philippines,  Azfar,
Kahkonen and Meagher (2001) highlight several reasons why the expected benefits of
decentralization  have failed to materialize  in those countries:  namely, that local
governments have  limited authority and are unable to adjust services,  even when they
perceive  local demands;  that citizen influence at the local level is hampered by limited
information  on the responsibilities and performance  of local governments6; that exit
mechanisms  have a limited effect on public service delivery and therefore fail to provide
a disciplinary incentive for local authorities; that local government capacities are
generally  weak; and that public goods with inter-jurisdictional  externalities are
particularly vulnerable to deterioration  in decentralized  settings.7 Litvack, Ahmad, and
Bird (1998) also concentrate  on the institutional determinants of successful
decentralization,  pointing out that much of the literature on decentralization assumes the
5  In this context, "voice"  refers to mechanisms of participation of protest that induce service providers
to improve their performance.  "Exit" refers to the practical ability of service users to use an alternative
provider (Hirschman  1970).
6 Hence the importance of the media, which they also found to be significant.
7 The reasons  for this are very similar to those for market failure more generally. An independent local
jurisdiction, much like an independent individual,  will be reluctant to invest fully in a product or service
whose benefits  are shared with  its neighbors.  In the absence of an external stimulus, an independent local
authority-like  many independent individuals-will only be prepared to meet the cost of a product or
service to the extent that it receives  a direct benefit in  return.  Even worse, the local authority may choose to
"free ride" on the investments of surrounding jurisdictions rather than invest anything in the program at all,
in much the same way as parents who refuse immunization for their children on the grounds that other
children's immunization status will protect their child as well.  This is why services such as immunization-
which has benefit externalities that "spill over" from one jurisdiction to its neighbors-are prone to
deterioration  when handed over to independent local jurisdictions  for implementation.
4existence of institutions  that are very weak in developing countries. They illustrate this
with reference to voice and exit options and how in developing  countries, weak
institutions can undermine  the effectiveness of both: "Democratic systems  are often frail,
rendering the electoral system a highly problematic method of achieving accountability.
Strong local participation can overcome weak formal election systems,  but powerful
elites make this difficult in many places. Mobility is often constrained due to poor
information, infrastructure and legal frameworks; which result in weak markets for land,
labor and capital. Although there is at least some degree of urbanization  in all countries,
particularly in smaller municipalities and throughout rural areas, it is often unrealistic for
a family to sell their land, learn of employment opportunities in other jurisdictions,
physically move to the new area, and borrow money in a new locality where they are
unknown.  The chances of overcoming these obstacles  are further reduced since
households are likely to be risk averse in developing countries due to low incomes and
weak social safety nets." Prud'homme  (1995) highlights other shortcomings associated
with decentralization,  including its effects on equity and efficiency.8
Also relevant is the design of central-local relations and the division of
responsibilities between central, intermediate  and local bodies. According to public
finance theory, decisionmaking  should occur at the lowest level of government that can
fully internalize its benefits and costs (Huther and Shah 1994). Two implications ensue:
first, that goods and services can be differentiated  according to the most appropriate  level
for their delivery, implying in turn that some should be decentralized  and others shouldn't
(Rondinelli,  McCullough,  and Johnson  1989; Girishankar  1998); and second, that local
s Proponents of decentralization  claim a number of benefits for the efficiency  and equity of
government performance.  On the efficiency side,  it is claimed that the proximity of local authorities to the
communities they govern improves the quality of governance  through factors such as strengthened
accountability,  reduced corruption  and improved  information on local circumstances  and preferences
(Hurley, Birch, and Eyles  1995; Mookherjee  2001). On the equity side, it is claimed that decentralizing the
responsibility  for targeting poor households improves the effectiveness of such efforts, again because  of
informational  issues related to the proximity of local authorities  to the communities  they administer
(Litvack, Ahmed, and Bird  1998). Prud'homme  (1995)  takes a more critical perspective  and highlights a
number of potentially negative  impacts. He points out that equity can suffer if decentralized local
authorities  are "captured" by local elites, and that the motivation for pro-poor targeting may be less strong
at the local level anyway. He also points out that decentralization can undermine both allocative  and
technical  efficiency. On allocative  efficiency,  he highlights the de-linkage between electoral behavior-the
usual way through which local preferences are voiced, at least in democratic systems-and actual social
preferences at the local  level. He also criticizes the assumption that local politicians  and bureaucrats  will
inevitably respond to these preferences,  citing a number of informational and principal-agent problems at
the local level.  On technical  efficiency,  he points to losses in economies  of scale and reduced investment in
public goods such as public information, research and development and efforts to promote technology
diffusion. Prud'homme admits the speculative nature of many of his comments. Subsequent research has
confirmed  some of his concerns and clarified others.  Khemani  (2001) finds that voters  in India are not as
myopic as theorists have often supposed, and that local voting pattems  are strongly correlated with local
government performance  in economically  productive investments such as infrastructure and with changes
in income distribution  over time. Ravallion  (1998), in a study of income redistribution  policies in
Argentina, finds that the effectiveness of local governments  in targeting the poor varies substantially from
province to province,  and that strong central oversight is necessary to ensure effective  targeting of the poor
by decentralized  local authorities.
5authorities should be provided with a level of revenue-raising,  spending and regulatory
authority that matches the responsibilities  they shoulder. Decentralized systems in
developing countries frequently  fail on both counts. Local governments  are given
responsibilities for which they are ill-prepared or too small to carry out, or functions that
should remain centralized (or at least under central supervision); and central
governments,  reluctant to cede too much power, limit the autonomy of local authorities or
preserve control over functions that might be better administered  locally (Bossert 2000).9
At one extreme, public goods are neglected,  inter-jurisdictional  inequities are
exacerbated,  economies of scale are lost, and essential  stabilizing functions deteriorate
(Litvack, Ahmed, and Bird 1998); at the other, local authorities  are provided with so little
autonomy that none of the anticipated benefits of decentralization  materialize.  The
absence of other institutional requirements for effective intergovernmental  relations-an
adequate constitutional  and legal framework, respect for the rule of law, and experience
with contract management, for example-may produce similar outcomes, even if the
balance of responsibilities is otherwise well-designed  (Azfar and others 1999).
A third issue is the impact of social, cultural and political factors.  Social and
cultural factors can influence the degree of "decision  space" provided to local
governments,1 0 the nature and content of interactions between central and local
authorities, the space for local voice in political life, acceptable  standards of practice  and
accountability, and the style of relationships  between public officials and community
representatives  (Bossert  1998; Atkinson and others 2000).  Social capital can also improve
the functioning of decentralized  systems, as first pointed out by Putnam (1993) and
confirmed by others since (Bossert  1998; Azfar and others  1999).  Change-averse
bureaucracies  can hinder the implementation of decentralizing  reforms, especially when
it involves a perceived loss of authority or the need to accommodate new political
masters. And political factors-centralized  political traditions,  interest group politics, and
9 Bossert (2000, p.6) illustrates this with reference to decentralization experiences  in Chile, Colombia
and Bolivia: "It is important to note that there are strong political forces  that may produce a tendency over
time to narrow choice over key functions. In Chile, the initial wide choice over human resources was later
restricted by the Statute of Primary Health Care Workers. In Colombia, the initial choice allowed by Law
60 was restricted by Law  100, which  assigned a percent of local funding to insurance plans. In Bolivia,  the
introduction of the Seguro Materno Infantil [a financing mechanism for maternal and child health services],
earmarked  a percentage of local funding for specific  expenditures and reduced choice over  fee collection.
These shifts focused on the major areas of control-allocation  of expenditure and human resources.  In the
case of restrictions  on human resources in Chile, they were the result of political pressure by the health
professionals.  In the cases of restricting choice on expenditures,  the initiatives were from the Ministries of
Health attempting to force local governments  to allocate funding to national priorities."
10  Bossert (1998) uses the term "decision  space"  to define the range of effective  choice allowed by
central  authorities over local authorities. He distinguishes  between formal and informal rules in setting the
boundaries of this space, and he incorporates the concept into a modified principal-agent  framework  for the
analysis of decentralization  in the health sector.  Case studies  in Uganda,  Zambia, Ghana and the
Philippines  (Bossert, Beauvais and Bowser 2000) and Chile, Colombia and Bolivia (Bossert 2000) illustrate
the use of this approach.
6political pressures to retain the status quo-can influence decentralization  at all stages,
from design and implementation  to the policy directions taken by local authorities,"
For all their apparent pessimism, none of the arguments in  this section constitutes
an outright rejection of the value or potential of decentralization.  They do, however,
highlight the extensive range of institutional preconditions necessary for it to be
successful,  and they point out areas where special caution is required. Proper institutional
design can  avoid many of the pitfalls described:  but given the political  and often
unplanned nature of decentralizing reforms, the luxury of careful design and phased
implementation  are seldom encountered  in practice.  Instead, decentralization  more
usually resembles a haphazard and hastily  implemented reform, often introduced as "a
reluctant and disorderly series of concessions by central  governments attempting to
maintain political stability" (Dillinger  1994).  The main issue of practical  interest is
therefore not whether to decentralize,  since this is usually a political decision outside the
influence of technical specialists and policy advisors, but rather what to decentralize and
how to decentralize  it. Both qualitative and quantitative  studies can inform these
questions. In the next section, we briefly examine the experience  of decentralization  in
the health sector, illustrating points made in this section with examples  from the
literature. The remainder of the paper concentrates  on immunization and the results of our
empirical  analysis.
4.  Decentralization  and the health sector
Experience  in the health sector has confirmed many of the problems summarized
above. Community participation has seldom materialized as expected, capacity
constraints have prevented decentralized  managers from carrying out their new functions
or adopting innovative approaches,  accountability has failed to emerge, and failures of
institutional design have left both central  and local authorities confused about their
responsibilities  and relationships.  Case studies have illustrated these issues in a number
of countries.  In Papua New Guinea, key issues included  severely limited management
capacity  at provincial  and sub-district levels,  a lack of participation by citizens and
communities in decisionmaking  and oversight processes, inadequate oversight of health
services by elected local officials, administrative confusion and inflamed relationships
between central and local authorities, and fragmentation  of workforce  development that
" Smith (1997) points out that, "Without doubt, the most serious mistake any reformer  can make is to
assume decentralization  to be a managerial  exercise devoid of political cause and consequence."  Collins
(1989)  and Collins and Green (1994) extend this point to paint an especially bleak (if rather extreme)
picture of decentralization as a "wolf in  sheep's clothing,"  describing it as a  technical excuse  for covert
political objectives  such as reducing the role of the state, dispersing social  and political conflict,
strengthening the position of elite  and dominant groups and expanding  central government control over the
periphery.  Manor (1999)  provides a comprehensive review of the political economy of (democratic)
decentralization,  illustrating  his discussion with examples from several sectors and a  wide range of
developing  countries.  Accounts  specific to the health sector include Araujo (1997), Atkinson  and others.
(2000) and Collins, Araujo and Barbosa  (2000), all  on Brazil, and Gilson,  Kilima and Tanner (1994) on
Tanzania.
7resulted in staff shortages and inequities in the distribution of human resources (Campos-
Outcalt and Newbrander  1989; Thomason, Newbrander,  and Kolehmainen-Aitken  1991;
Kolehmainen-Aitken  1992; Campos-Outcalt, Kewa, and Thomason 1995). 12 In Brazil,
tensions between the government's  devolutionary intentions, the country's strong
centralist political tradition, and the resistance of civil servants and other bureaucratic
actors resulted in a "hybrid" of devolution and deconcentration in which central and
peripheral responsibilities  overlapped, equity was compromised and the fragility of local
governments prevented them from undertaking effective oversight of the health sector
(Araiijo  1997; Collins, Arauijo, and Barbosa 2000). In Mexico, too, decentralization  fell
short of its devolutionary intentions and was strongly opposed by bureaucratic  actors,
becoming "more a measure to increase central control than a democratic principle or a
response to political pressure from below"; and centralized political traLditions made
decentralized planning and intersectoral  coordination difficult to achieve,  with
consequences  for the equity and efficiency of health services (Gonzalez-Block and others
1989). In Chile, local govemments were provided with little autonomy over key health
sector functions, and inconsistencies  in the devolution of responsibility  for primary health
services led to significant variance in local governments'  provision of funds for these
services (Bossert, Larrafiaga,  and Ruiz-Meir 2000). In Bolivia, mechanisms to allow local
communities to choose between health and other priorities led to a sharp reduction in
health spending after decentralization,  and limited managerial capacities  at the central
level led to weaknesses in the monitoring and supervision of local govenmments (Bossert,
Larraniaga,  and Ruiz-Meir 2000). In the Philippines, health workers resisted efforts  to
devolve their employment to local govemments, inter-jurisdictional  inequities were
exacerbated,  and local health spending failed to keep pace with the cost of devolved
health functions in spite of substantial  increases in central-local transfers  and local
governments'  revenue raising powers (Bossert, Beauvais, and Bowser 2000; Lieberman
2002).
In Tanzania, district health managers  lacked the authority and skills to address
problems they identified at the district level, conflicts arose between demands for central
control and local discretion, and accountability structures became confusing, with
"multiple and cross-cutting flows of authority within and between levels of the system"
(Gilson, Kilima, and Tanner  1994). In Uganda, the potential for involving community
groups and local leaders in decisionmaking  processes has gone largely unfulfilled,
devolved civil servants have experienced a worsening of their salaries, working
conditions and promotional opportunities, patronage  and tribalism have entered  local
decisions on recruitment and promotion, and preventive services have suffered through a
combination of weak central oversight, incompatibility  between donor-funded vertical
programs and decentralized primary health services,  and the failure of local authorities  to
prioritize these services when faced with other concerns (Mwesigye  1999; Jeppsson and
12 Not surprisingly,  a survey of health workers found widespread negative perceptions of the process
and outcomes of decentralization in Papua New Guinea (Campos-Outcalt, Kewa,  and Thomason  1995).
8Okuonzi 2000; Bossert, Beauvais,  and Bowser 2000).  Gilson and Mills (1995)  identified
similar problems in other countries in sub-Saharan  Africa as well.1 3
Not all accounts have been negative, however. Tendler and Freedheim's  (1994)
account of public health services  in the state of Ceara, Brazil, indicates the positive
outcomes that can follow when decentralized  authorities implement  far-reaching
institutional and management reforms  and central authorities provide  them with the
proper incentives, guidance and support.'
4 Bossert, Soebekti, and Rai (1991)  illustrate the
benefits that can accrue  from investments in managerial  capacity building, drawing on
the example of a donor-funded project in Indonesia.  And a collection of studies in Latin
America by the POLICY Project (2000) shows how community participation can be
institutionalized  in decentralized health systems and improve  the implementation of
programs focused on sexual and reproductive  health.
A related point is that many critical accounts have suffered from methodological
or interpretive flaws, commonly criticizing decentralization  as part of an entire basket of
reforms (such as user fees, structural  adjustment programs and policies to promote
economic liberalization)  and failing to distinguish the specific strengths, weaknesses  and
determinants of each (see, for example, Garfield  1999, and Birn, Zimmerman and
Garfield 2000). To some extent the problem is unavoidable:  reforms do tend to occur
together, and they often have mutually reinforcing characteristics  that can make
disaggregation  difficult (Gilson and Mills  1995); but to condemn or criticize a specific
reform without considering these interactions is to "throw out the baby with the
bathwater"  and provides little information of policy relevance.
5.  Decentralization and immunization
The impact of decentralization  on immunization is a matter of special concem for
three reasons. First, immunization  is among the cheapest and most effective health
13  An early publication by the World  Health Organization (Mills and others  1990) also tncluded brief
case studies on Botswana,  Chile, Mexico,  The Netherlands, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,  Senegal,
Spain, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.  An extensive literature also exists on the performance  of district health
systems,  aspects of which are relevant to decentralization  as well.  A recent paper prepared for the
Commission on Macroeconomics  and Health provides a comprehensive summary of this literature
(Oliveira-Cruz,  Hanson, and Mills 2001).
14 Tendler and Freedheim point out that "although  this case might be seen as a success in
decentralization  of public service  from state to municipal govemment,  the success had more to do with
something done by central, rather than local, government"  (1994, p.l773). In a section titled "The Central
in the Decentralized",  they describe several central government actions that played an important role in the
success of the Ceara case. These included:  significant investments in public information regarding public
health services,  which led communities to hold elected mayors accountable for these services in their area;
careful control over selected  human resource  issues, which reduced patronage at the local  level; a slow,
phased approach to implementing the program,  in which early adopters were nurtured to success and the
news of these "success stories" was widely shared,  thereby overcoming the reluctance of local politicians in
non-adopting  areas by generating public demand for them to join the program; and strong central
involvement in motivating and inspiring  front-line health  workers, which gave them a broader identity than
their local links, assured them of support by the central level, and thus enabled them to say "no" when
pressured by local politicians  to divert the program toward local political objectives.
9interventions available  and is a core element of public health programs in all countries.
Properly carried out, immunization programs can have a dramatic  impact on childhood
morbidity and mortality from communicable  diseases,  especially in developing countries
and especially among the poor (Jamison and others  1993; Koenig, Bishai, and Khan
2000); and they are increasingly recognized as a essential element of national
development strategies, and not just as public health programs alone. Second,
immunization coverage rates-which measure  the proportion of children of a certain age
that have been vaccinated correctly relative to a country's immunization schedule-
provide a convenient and readily available source of data for cross-national  comparisons
of public service provision, and can be used (with due caution) as a marker of the impact
of policies such as decentralization  on public service provision more broadly (Bos and
Batson 2000). Third, immunization  is an exemplar of services on which decentralization
may have a negative effect-in theory at least-because  of its public good elements, its
extemalities,  and the impact of these characteristics  on local govemment behavior,
community participation and accountability.
Theoretical studies of decentralization  generally predict a negative impact for
services with inter-jurisdictional  extemalities and public good characteristics  (Besley and
Coate 1999; Bardhan and Mookerhjee  1998). Immunization has aspects of both.
Externalities arise because the benefits of vaccination are shared, accruing not only to the
immunized community but also to those around it,15 while immunization-related  public
goods include such essential tasks such as disease surveillance and health communication
activities, the benefits of which are so widely shared as to be virtually indivisible.  Left to
themselves,  local authorities may take advantage of these shared benefits by "free riding"
on the immunization status of their neighbors, either by providing inadequate resources
for their own programs or neglecting to carry out essential functions  such as monitoring
and supervision or disease surveillance.  If a majority of  jurisdictions adopt this approach,
then the functioning of the immunization  program nationally-and therefore the level of
disease protection in the country as a whole, including  for those who are immunized-
can be compromised as a result.
Preventing this requires a strong role for the center, even in decentralized  systems.
In practice,  however, decentralizing reforms are frequently accompanied by a weakening
of key central functions,  and the stabilizing and coordinating role of central authorities is
compromised.  In Nepal, for example,  decentralization was associated  with significant
staff cuts at the central level, with negative implications for the country's Expanded
Program on Immunization (World Bank 2000). In Uganda, central support for monitoring
and supervision was reduced, and coverage rates fell as a result (Govemment of Uganda
1998). A detailed  case study of decentralization  and immunization in Indonesia revealed
similar problems in that country, with a significant reduction of central involvement in
areas such as vaccine procurement, policy development, monitoring and evaluation,
public information, quality assurance, and disease surveillance  activities,  among others
IS This is known as "herd immunity." For comprehensive descriptions,  see Anderson and May (1990)
and Fine (1993).
10(Soerojo and Wilson 2001).  Fielden and Neilsen (2001)  summarize the appropriate
division of immunization-related  tasks between central and local  authorities in
decentralized systems, pointing out that tasks such as policy making, donor coordination,
vaccine procurement and overall monitoring should remain within the purview of central
authorities, while other tasks such as the formulation of service delivery strategies and
carrying out front-line disease surveillance  can be devolved to sub-national  units. Soerojo
and Wilson (2001), drawing lessons from Indonesia's  experience with decentralization,
emphasize  the importance of making these distinctions clear to all parties-both central
and local-and ensuring that an adequate legal  and regulatory framework exists for
activities (such as disease surveillance) that require significant central-local  coordination.
A second theoretical prediction  is that community participation,  especially in
resource allocation decisions, may have a negative impact on immunization programs.
The reasons for this are not difficult to understand. Communities,  faced with a multitude
of pressing needs and generally unaware of the value of immunization, may consider
immunization  to be a low priority among the various other goods and services-including
curative health services-which  their local authorities can provide.  In the absence of
other incentives (such as strong central pressure or financial controls), local authorities
may respond to these preferences by allocating funding away from immunization-and
may not in  any case be held accountable for its provision by the community,  whether
directly or through electoral mechanisms-and  local immunization programs may suffer
as a result. Even with central pressure and oversight, however, the principal-agent
relationship between local and central authorities may lead to the same conclusion,  with
local authorities neglecting central requirements  and responding more strongly to local
preferences  instead.1 6
Published accounts tend to confirn  these expectations.  In Uganda, local
governments spent less on public and semi-public  goods after decentralization  than
before it, with a consequent under-provision of essential public health services such as
immunization  (Akin, Hutchinson, and Strumpf 2001). In the Philippines, decentralization
shifted the balance of health expenditures  away from prevention and toward curative care
16 Akin, Hutchinson and Strumpf (2001)  summarize this argument as follows: "[Theoretical  models
predict that] decentralization  can lead to an increased government provision of private goods at the expense
of public goods.  This is because  local governments ignore the spillover benefit of public goods to
neighboring  governments or are less subject to demands of international  aid agencies who pressure for
public goods projects. But perhaps more importantly,  it is because when private type goods are allowed to
be chosen,  local citizens will behave rationally.  They will reveal preferences  for goods that most benefit
them directly. Thus the argument goes that very decentralized  provision of goods by governments, in which
local citizens push for choices given a budget constraint,  will often lead to a revealed preference problem
similar to the one that leads to the necessity for public provision to begin with. Small governments will tend
to vote to provide the goods for which citizens reveal preferences.  They will therefore tend to spend on
private goods type curative care clinic visits rather than on public goods type services such as health
education  and communicable disease control.  Small governments may, therefore, behave too much like
individuals,  with the residents not revealing their preferences  for public goods but in  fact for private goods
provided publicly.  The hypotheses from the model, therefore, suggest that,  in contrast to the conventional
wisdom, decentralization  of allocation decisions for services such as health care may in fact reduce societal
welfare."(Solon and others 1999 cited in Soerojo and Wilson 2001). In Nicaragua, local authorities
ignored central directives to allocate 46 percent of their health expenditures  to primary
health care and instead allocated larger shares to secondary care, with immunization
coverage in the affected districts falling by up to 50 percent in three years (Bim,
Zimmerman,  and Garfield 2000). In Indonesia, tight competition  from other sectors led
local mayors to abandon  their commitment that 15 percent of their budgets  should go to
health (World Bank 2001a, cited in Soerojo and Wilson 2001). Similar phenomena have
been noted in  Tanzania (Gilson and Mills  1995), Uganda  (Jeppson and Okuonzi 2000)
and Colombia (Munioz-Nates  1999 cited in WHO  1999).'7
Even more troublesome is the possibility that local authorities, under pressure to
raise their own revenues and without much in the way of community support for public
financing of immunization, might turn to user charges  or other forms of cost recovery to
finance these services instead. The effect of user charges on the utilization of
immunization services has been well document and is generally negative (England and
others 2001). China, where  some prefectures  and counties introduced user fees for
preventive services in response to reduced central grants in the early 1990s, and where
these services are reported  to have suffered as a result, is the usual example (Zheng and
Hillier 1995; Ruitai  1999, Zhang and others 1999); but others also exist (Mwesigye  1999;
England and others 2001).
A third prediction is that decentralization  will not necessarily improve the extent
to which local authorities are held accountable  for the provision of immunization
services. Since most developing countries typically invest little in public information or
education  on immunization  (Kaddar and others 2000), and since there is little evidence
that household demand plays a significant role in influencing immunization coverage in
information-poor circumstances (Gauri and Khaleghian  2002), it is unlikely that
communities will use "voice" mechanisms-even if they exist, which they often don't-
to express concern about immunization, especially when faced by other pressing needs.
(Indeed a negative impact is even possible, as discussed earlier.) "Exit" options are also
unlikely to stimulate much accountability.  Constraints on geographic exit have been
discussed already, but other types of exit-attending  private providers rather than public
clinics, for example-are  also of limited relevance when,  as with immunization in
developing countries, private providers generally have little interest in the service or are
unaffordable to the majority of households,  and when few other options exist.
Households, especially poor ones, are therefore  faced with the public sector as a
17 Faguet (2001),  using the change  in sectoral  expenditures by local authorities  in Bolivia before and
after decentralization as an indicator of community preferences  and demand,  finds that while basic social
services were generally given a high priority by local communities, services associated with objective
indicators of need-such as education, water management and urban development-were  given the highest
priority. Allocations to the health sector did not change substantially  relative to those in other sectors.
12monopoly provider of immunization  services, a situation in which exit ceases to be a
meaningful way of stimulating accountability (Paul  1991).'8
A tentative conclusion  from this discussion is that immunization,  in addition to its
well-known propensity for market failure,  is also prone to a kind of "government  failure"
in decentralized  systems,  and largely for the same reasons: namely, that its public good
characteristics and externalities  lead local governments  to "free ride" on other
jurisdictions and make them less willing to meet the full cost of immunizing their local
populations; that substantial infornational asymmetries  are involved, both between the
community  and local authorities (leading to accountability failures) and between local
authorities  and the central government (leading to principal-agent problems); and that
monopolistic provision-in this case, the fact that non-public  providers don't provide
much in the way of immunization  services-limits the public's opportunities  for exit and
prevents local authorities from receiving the signals that such options might provide.
On a more positive note, decentralization may enable local authorities to adapt
and tailor immunization  services to local  circumstances.  This might be of particular
relevance  in countries that are ethnically or linguistically diverse, in which local tailoring
(of informational  materials,  for example) might be beneficial. For other countries,
however,  it could be argued that the negative implications  of decentralization  will
dominate,  and that a negative  relationship between decentralization and immunization
coverage will result. This is the relationship predicted by the theoretical literature,  and
which we test in the empirical estimations below.
6.  Data and variables
To examine  these issues, we use a cross-sectional time-series of data on low- and
middle-income countries from 1980 to  1997. Data on immunization coverage were
obtained from WHO and UNICEF. Data were obtained on coverage rates for two
vaccines:  measles vaccine,  a single vaccine usually administered at around nine months
of age, and DPT3 vaccine, the third of a three-vaccine  series against diphtheria, pertussis
(whooping cough) and tetanus that is usually administered  at around 10 to  16 weeks of
age. Coverage rates, which measure the proportion of children  immunized with each of
these vaccines  at one year of age, were used as dependent variables.
Data on decentralization  were obtained  from the Database of Political Institutions.
(Beck and others 2000). Decentralization  was defined as the presence  of taxing, spending
or regulatory authority on the part of subnational polities such as states, provinces,
districts or municipalities,  and was coded as a binary variable. The DPI provided this
information  for a relatively small number of countries (n=65), reflecting its reliance on
sources that place little emphasis on this issue. Additional  data were therefore collected
from a wide range of other sources and incorporated in the data set using the same criteria
18 Azfar, Kkhk6nen  and Meagher  (2001) document this phenomenon with regard to immunization
services in Uganda and the Philippines.
13as those of the DPI.  ' 9 Data on fiscal decentralization  were obtained from the World Bank
and were based on primary data in the International Monetary  Fund's annual  Government
Financial  Statistics (IMF 2001). Two variables for fiscal decentralization  were used: one
measuring subnational  expenditures as a share  of total government expenditures
(indicating the fiscal freedom of subnational authorities, pursuant to the limitations
discussed earlier), and the other measuring health spending as a proportion of all
subnational expenditures  (indicating the prominence of health within the overall  spending
pattern of local authorities).
Control variables were obtained for each country-year from the World Bank's
World Development Indicators  data set (200 lb). These  included GDP per capita in
constant  1995 US dollars, population density, population size, and the illiteracy rate,
among others. Variables  for democracy and regime durability were taken from the Polity
IV data set of Marshall  and Jaggers (2000). A composite variable for institutional quality
was created as an equally weighted combination of five variables-bureaucratic  quality,
corruption in government, risk of expropriation of property, risk of repudiation  of
government contracts,  and strength of the rule of law-from the political risk section of
IRIS-3,  a data set based on the International  Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating system
that provides annual measures of political, financial and economic risk in 135 countries
(Knack and IRIS 2000, PRS Group 2000). A variable for ethnic tension, measured on a
six-point scale, was also taken from this data set, and data on ethnolinguistic
fractionalization were taken from Taylor and Hudson (1972) and Roeder (2001).20 Data
on donor involvement were obtained directly from PAHO  and UNICEF and are the same
as those used in Gauri and Khaleghian (2002). Data on income inequality were taken
from Deininger and Squire (1996). Countries were grouped in three income categories
(low, middle and high) on the basis of the classification  reported in the World Bank's
annual World Development Report (World Bank 2001 c).2' High-income  countries were
excluded from the analysis.
'9 Countries with incomplete or missing data for decentralization  in the DPI included Albania,
Armenia, Bangladesh,  Belarus,  Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,  China, Cote
d'Ivoire, Croatia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Estonia, Gambia, Georgia,  Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Guyana.,
Haiti, Honduras,  Indonesia, Kazakhstan,  Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania,  Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Moldova, Mongolia, Mongolia,  Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal,  Slovak Republic,  Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Togo, Turkmenistan,  Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,  Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Excluding
these countries from the analysis did not change the ditection  or approximate magnitude of our parameter
estimates but did reduce the significance  of some variables, as reported in Table  6. The only exception was
the decentralization  variable itself, which remained significant even when these countries  were excluded
from the analysis.
20 The ethnolinguistic fractionalization  index measures the probability that two randomly selected
persons from the population  will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group  For more details,  see Taylor
and Hudson (1972).
21  For the years prior to  1987, when income categories were not reported in the WDR, countries were
allocated to income categories  on the basis of their borrowing  status, since the definition of these categories
(such as "civil works preference"  for low-income countries, and "IBRD eligible" for upper middle-income
147.  Methods
Our empirical  analysis had two objectives:  first, to characterize  differences  in
immunization coverage between decentralized  and non-decentralized countries,
controlling for other determinants  such as national income and contact with donors; and
second, to examine how these effects are modified in the presence of factors such as
democracy, illiteracy,  institutional  quality and ethnic heterogeneity.  To do this, we
modeled immunization coverage rates using the general form
Y, = DEC, + X,,  + Zt + e,,
where Y is the immunization rate in country i at time t, DEC is a binary variable for
decentralization  (as described  earlier), X is a vector of structural  indicators,  Z is a vector
of interaction terms, and e is a randomly distributed error term. Models of this form
usually face two problems when analyzed with ordinary least-squares  methods:
autocorrelation,  such as when coverage rates in adjacent years (and therefore the error
terms on adjacent observations) are correlated  with each other; and heteroskedasticity,  or
non-equal variance of errors.  More robust methods are therefore required. We therefore
used OLS regressions with year dummies to correct for inter-year correlations,  and
Huber-corrected  standard errors to provide parameter estimates robust to panel
heteroskedasticity.  Our coefficients therefore represent the between-country (cross-
sectional)  effects of the variables of interest. Although Generalized Estimating Equations
(GEE) would have been a more efficient approach, with neither year dummies nor the
associated loss in degrees of freedom but an adjustment for autocorrelation  nonetheless,
estimations carried out using GEE require the correlation  structure of the data to be
specified correctly and may be inaccurate if this is not the case (Diggle, Liang, and Zeger
1994). In view of this, and given the limited impact of year dummies on the degrees of
freedom available, we adopted the former, simpler approach and used GEE as a way of
checking the models thus constructed.  The reported results are therefore all from OLS
models with year dummies and Huber-corrected  standard errors.22
An additional problem with using immunization  coverage  as a dependent variable
is posed by the bounded nature of this variable.  It is impossible to obtain coverage rates
above  100 percent or below zero, but an estimation based on absolute rates can lead to
countries) was seen to correspond to the income thresholds adopted  in  subsequent reports.  For more, see
World Bank (2001 c)
22 Another alternative would have been to use a fixed  effects model with robust standard  errors to
correct for panel  heteroskedasticity and year dummies to correct for inter-year correlations.  By contrast to
GEE, coefficients  from which represent the cross-sectional  (or between-country)  effects of the variables of
interest, coefficients  from a fixed effects model represent the within-country, time-series  information in  the
data. These models are therefore  inappropriate for our data, since the decentralization status of most
countries did not change during the study period and would therefore have been ignored in a fixed effects
analysis.  Fixed effects  models are also computationally  inefficient,  since they are equivalent to including a
dummy variable for each unit (country) in  the data set.
15models that predict rates outside of this range.  To prevent this, a logit transformation can
be applied to the dependent variable, and models can be constructed using the
transformed variable  instead of the original rates.  In practice,  however,  the coefficients
that result  from such an analysis are difficult to interpret-especially  by contrast to
simple coverage rates, where the coefficients represent the percent change in
immunization coverage associated  with a given variable-and the outcome may in any
case be the same. We therefore used logit-transformed  data to construct and test the
models but report our findings using the untransformed  variables  for ease of
interpretation.23
Several  caveats are worth mentioning. Decentralization  is a complex
phenomenon, and the use of quantitative methods with a small number of control
variables runs the risk of over-simplification:  hence, perhaps,  the heavy reliance on case
studies and qualitative methods in the decentralization  literature  so far. However, as
McClure  (1995)  points out, cross-national  analysis can provide insights into how
concepts and theory translate into practice, in the aggregate  at least, and it can indicate
general  trends that might otherwise be masked by the "strong prior beliefs" that
characterize much of the literature  on decentralization  (Litvack, Ahmad and Bird 1998).
While cross-national  studies can not (nor should they) provide country-specific  policy
prescriptions, they can improve our understanding of how phenomena such as
decentralization  work in general terms, and are useful when interpreted  in this light. Two
interpretive issues are worth mentioning specifically,  however. First, given the between-
country, cross-sectional interpretation  of our coefficients (as explained earlier), there
remains the possibility that the observed relationships  are confounded  by other,
unobserved variables.  The inclusion of a wide range of control variables  mitigates against
this to some extent, but in the absence of data on coincident reforms24-and without a
long enough time period to look at within-country changes,  in which each country would
serve as its own control and unobserved variables would be less of an issue-the
23 For another  example,  see Over's (1997)  analysis of the effect of societal variables on rates of urban
HIV infection in developing  countries.
24 Decentralization might be acting  as a proxy for other reformns.  For example,  countries that adopt
decentralization policies might also adopt user fees or other reforms that reduce the demand for
immunization.  If this were the case, then the coefficient on the decentralization variable would represent
not only the effect of decentralization but also of these other reforms. Interpreting it as the pure effect of
decentralization would therefore be biased.  In this study, we assume no correlation between
decentralization  and other reforms. Although  we have no way of testing this empirically,  we argue its
validity on two grounds. First, decentralization  is essentially  a political reform. As such, the factors that
motivate it are fundamentally distinct from those that motivate  sector-specific reforms such as user charges
or hospital autonomy, even  if they may coincide  in time, principle or practice.  Second, almost all the
decentralized  countries in our data set were already decentralized by  1980. This was prior to the widespread
adoption of user charges and related health reforms in the late 1980s and early  1990s, so a temporal
coincidence  between the two is therefore unlikely.  This might have been different if our interest was in
health system decentralization  (i.e.,  deconcentration),  which was promoted as part of health reform efforts
in the late  1980 and beyond; but since our interest  is in political decentralization,  it is less of a concern.
16possibility of confounding remains open.25 Second, causal  inferences must be drawn with
caution.  This is a standard problem in statistical  interpretation but is frequently
overlooked in practice.  Attributions of cause and effect must therefore remain
speculative, however strong the statistical  relationships observed.
The choice of interaction terms was driven by a combination of theoretical  and
practical  concerns.  On democracy,  most theorists  have proposed a positive interaction
between democratic  govenment and political decentralization,  usually because of the
assumption that democratic  elections will  improve the accountability  of decentralized
authorities (Mookherjee  2001). This does not always manifest in practice, however.
Sundar (2001) describes how democratically elected local governments in India have
been captured by economic and political elites at the village and township levels, and
how the involvement of these groups has distorted the priorities of local governments  and
led to participatory processes based less on social capital than "old-fashioned  capital" (p.
2007). On ethnic heterogeneity,  most authors  speculate a positive interaction with
political decentralization,  either because of the latter's effect on political stability (which
is assumed to improve when diverse ethnic and linguistic groups  are "closer" to the
government)  or because of the improved ability of decentralized  governments  to tailor
their programs and services  to the needs and preferences  of these populations (La Porta
and others 1999; Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 2001). The interaction  between
decentralization  and national income is included to follow up on observations  published
by Robalino,  Picazo and Voetberg  (2001) on the relationship between decentralization
and infant mortality rates, which suggested a negative relationship in low-income
countries and a positive relationship in middle-income  countries,  and a similar
observation for the relationship between democracy and immunization coverage  in Gauri
and Khaleghian (2002).  The interaction with development assistance was included to test
the proposition that development agencies prefer working in centralized settings over
decentralized ones (Dollar and Pritchett  1998). Given the traditionally vertical nature of
most immunization programs (and the equally vertical nature of the World Health
Organization's  own Expanded Programme  on Immunization), this question has special
relevance to immunization and is well-suited to being tested when immunization  rates are
the dependent variable. Finally, several other interactions were tested but proved
insignificant.  These included literacy rates, institutional quality,  income inequality and
access to communication  technologies. These  are discussed at greater length in the
Findings section below.
Table  I presents summary statistics for the variables used in our regressions.
There were 2,132 potential observations in the data set, each representing  a single
25 In this analysis, the time-series information  in the data is ignored: each observation on a given
country is treated as a separate observation, adjusted  for time effects,  and thus increases the sample size;
but the analysis does not look at changes over time,  since for most countries there was no change in their
decentralization  status from  1980 to  1997 and a longitudinal  analysis would therefore provide no relevant
information.
17country-year for all low and middle-income  countries over an 18-year period.26
Excluding observations with missing data for the dependent variables reduced this to 736
potential observations  in low-income  countries and 1396 in middle-income countries.
Excluding observations with missing data for key independent variables-log of GDP,
log of population size, log of population density, participation in the UNICEF's Vaccine
Independence  Initiative, democracy score, institutional  quality score, illiteracy rate and
ethnic tension score, as reported in the basic regressions in Table 2-reduced these
numbers to approximately  330 and 380 observations for low and middle-income
countries respectively.  In 1997, there were 57 low-income countries  and 81 middle-
income countries in the data set. Using these figures as an approximation for the entire
period, there were an average of six observations for each low-income country and five
for each middle-income country.  The actual number of observations  per country is likely
to have be higher than this, since there were a number of countries in each income group
for which no data were available at all. Observations with missing data were only weakly
correlated with coverage rates (Table  1),  suggesting that the missing data are not biasing
the results. Tables 2,  3, and 4 present the results of our empirical analysis. Table 2 reports
results for the entire data set,  in which low and middle-income  countries are included
together. Tables 3 and 4 repeat the regressions  for each group separately.  Except as
reported otherwise,  regression coefficients were obtained using OLS with year dummies
and robust variance  estimation.27 Most estimations obtained R2 values of around 0.58.
Leaving out the year dummies reduced this by a surprisingly  small amount, to around
0.55. The inclusion of dummy variables  for each geographic  region did not significantly
change any of the coefficients  or findings reported below, even though countries in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had significantly higher coverage rates than
those in other regions.28 Table 6 presents results from the original DPI data set separately
from those obtained from the additional data on decentralization  status. Throughout the
paper, 95 percent confidence intervals  are indicated in square brackets, and the term
"percent change"-when  used in reference  to immunization coverage-refers  to the
absolute change in percent coverage with a given vaccine, not the relative change (e.g,.
an increase in coverage from 55 to 75 percent is recorded as a "20 percent increase").
26 This number only includes country-years  for which GDP data were available.  Without GDP data,
countries could not be classified  into an income category for the purposes of this calculation.  Gaps in GDP
data were more pronounced  in earlier years. This explains  the difference  between the number of actual
observations  (i.e., 2,132) and the number of expected observations  calculated by using the number of low-
and middle-income  countries in  1997 as an estimate (i e., 57 low- and  71 middle-income  countries
multiplied by 18 years, or 2,484).
27 GEE estimations produced broadly similar results to those reported  in these tables, as did the use of
logit-transformed dependent  vanables. The only exception  was the variable for participation in UNICEF's
Vaccine Independence Initiative,  which was unstable in GEE estimations and ranged from strongly positive
to strongly negative  in these regressions.  This variable was significant and positive in all regressions
carried out using robust OLS with year dummies.
28  Especially surprisingly was the fact that including regional dummies  for Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union did not significantly change the coefficients or findings regarding democracy or
decentralization.  Neither did leaving these countries out of the analysis altogether.
18Table 1.  Summary statistics, low- and middle-income countries
Mean values in
low and middle  Correlation with  Correlation with
income countries  vaccine coverage  missing data flag
Mean  SD  N  Low  Middle  DTP3  Measles  DTP3  Measles
Decentralization  0.24  0.42  1244  0.21  0.26  0.16  0.07  0.11  0.04
log GDP per capita  6.98  1 13  2047  5.76  7.62  0.46  0.37  -0.11  -0.09
log total population  1538  2.06  2132  15.95  15.08  -0.11  -007
log population
density  3.81  1 39  2067  3.81  3.80  0.24  0.17  0.01  0.01
Participation  in VII  02  015  2132  002  0.03  004  0.04
Democracy  score  3 39  3 82  1701  1.97  4.34  0.33  0.25  0.15  0.11
Institutional quality  15.96  4.81  1263  14.20  16.90  0.55  0.49  -0.01  -0.003
Illiteracy rate  34.12  24.62  1729  51.55  23.64  -0.54  -0.51  0.12  0.12
Ethnic tension  2.41  1.50  1265  3.00  2.09  -0.35  -0.36  -0.01  0.0003
AidperGNP  9.71  14.21  2022  17.11  5.47  -0.1  -0.13  0.14  0.13
Table 2. Combined regressions,  low  and middle-income  countries together,  DTP3 and measles
Linear terms, DTP3  Quadratic terms, DTP3
N  707  707
0.5944  0.5906
Coefficient  SE  Sig.  Coefficient  SE  Sig.
Decentralization  16  4.3  *  19.06  4.56  *
log GDP per capita  4.42  1.2  7.69  1.42  *
log total population  ..  -0.67  0.5  . -0.38  0.52
log population density  3.49  0.55  ***  3.03  0.59  '**
Participation in VII.  12.43  2.82  ***  9.87  3.44
Democracy  score  4 28  0.54  ***  3.76  0.61  *
Institutional quality  1.4  0.2  1.44  0.2
Illiteracy rate  -0.42  0.04  "'*  -0.39  0.037  ***
Ethnic tension  -3.46  1.12  ***  0.14  1
Democracy * log GDP  -2.7  0.33
Decentralization * log GDP  -9.7  2 57  *
(Democracy * log GDP)A2  -0.078  0.012  ***
(Decentralization * log GDP)  A2  -0.36  0.085  *
Ethnic tension * log GDP  1.48  0.65  **  -0.81  0.6
Aid per capita  * log GDP  0.26  0.06  ***  0.29  0.06  *
Linear terms, measles  Quadratic terms, measles
N  689  689
R 2 0.5855  0.5795
Coefficient  SE  Sig.  Coefficient  SE  Sig.
Decentralization  15 53  4.97  +  13 4  5.41  **
log GDP per capita  3.63  1.19  ***  5.61  1.37  ***
log total population  0.45  0.48  0.68  0.5
log population density  1.99  0.58  ***  1 77  0.6
Partcipation in VII  11.36  2.5  ***  9.52  2.9
Democracy  score  2.62  0.58  ***  2.3  0.64  ***
Institutional  quality  1.14  0.23  ***  1.18  0.23  ***
Illiteracy  rate  -0.31  0 038  -**  0.29  0.04  *
Ethnic tension  -6.53  1.15  ***  -3.93  1.1
Democracy  * log GDP  -1.75  0.34  ***
Decentralization  * log GDP  -9.94  2.95  **
(Democracy * log GDP) A2  -0.05  0.01  *
(Decentralization  * log GDP)  A2  -0.27  0.1
Ethnic tension * log GDP  1.89  0.66  ***  0.26  0.64
Aid per capita * log GDP  0.21  0.06  ***  0.23  0.06  *
Key  *0  05 <p  0 10, **0.01  <p  ￿0.05,  **=p 0.01
198.  Findings
1.  Decentralization  is associated with higher immunization coverage rates in low-
income countries,  but lower coverage in middle-income  countries.
The parameter estimate for the decentralization  variable is large and statistically
significant in both low and middle-income  countries.  Surprisingly,  however, the sign of
the coefficient  is different for each:  it is positive in low-income countries, indicating
higher coverage rates in decentralized countries than centralized ones, and negative in
middle-income  countries, indicating the reverse (Tables 3 and 4).29 Other things being
equal,  decentralization  is associated with an 8.8 percent increase  in DTP3 coverage in
low-income  countries  [3.9, 13.7] but a 4.9 percent decrease  in DTP3 coverage  in middle-
income  countries  [1.5,  8.4]. Similar results were obtained with the measles vaccine,
where the coefficients  were 8.3 percent for low-income countries  [3.2,  13.4] and negative
5.5 percent for middle-income  countries  [1.9, 9.2]. A simple comparison of mean
coverage rates in decentralized vs.  centralized middle-income  countries suggests  the
same relationship (Table 5). Country examples  also support this finding. For example
Benin, a decentralized  low-income country with a GDP per capita of $387 in 1997,
reported coverage rates of 78 and 82 percent for the DTP3 and measles vaccines
respectively; whereas  its neighbor Togo, a centralized country with a slightly lower per
capita GDP of $345, reported coverage rates of 33 and 38 percent for these vaccines in
the same year. Among middle-income  countries, Venezuela, a decentralized  country with
a per capita GDP of $3,600, reported coverage rates of 60 and 68 percent for DTP3 and
measles  in  1997; whereas Costa Rica,  a centralized country with a similar income  level
(GDP per capita $3,550) reported rates of over 90 percent for both.
29 In Table 4,  the negative coefficient on the variable for log of GDP per capita is caused by one
outlier country,  Malawi.  Removing  Malawi from the regressions changes the sign on this variable and
makes it lose significance.  The other parameter estimates remain unchanged.
20Table 3. Regression  results, middle-income  countries
Democracy interaction,  Ethnic tension interaction,
DTP3, basic regression  DTP3  DTP3
N  388  300  300
R
2 0.5449  0.5844  0.5981
Coeff.  SE  Sig  Coeff.  SE  Sig.  Coeff.  SE  Sig.
Decentralization  -4 92  1.76  ***  -15.94  4.54  *  -17.41  3.2
log GDP per capita  2.65  1.56  *  1.29  1.86  2.44  1.97
logtotalpopulation  -1  18  0.6  *  -0.19  0.71  0.21  0.68
log population density  1 15  0.64  *  1.01  0.66  -0.033  0.66
Participation  in VII  10.33  2.53  ***  1.8  3.71  2.78  3.22
Democracy  score  -1.49  0.27  ***  -2 32  0.31  *  -2.21  0.31  ***
Institutional quality  1 09  0.25  ***  1.48  0.3  ***  0.97  0.35  ***
Illiteracy rate  -0  41  0.06  ***  -0.37  0.081  ***  -0.39  0.08
Ethnic tension  -I  54  0.68  **  -2.35  0.76  -4.54  0.94  ***
Decentralization *
Democracy  1.35  0.61
Decentralization * Ethnic
tension  5.68  1.38  ***
Democracy  interaction,  Ethnic tension interaction,
Measles, basic regression  measles  measles
N  377  293  293
R 2 0.5908  0.6386  0.6242
Coeff.  SE  Sig.  Coeff.  SE  Sig.  Coeff.  SE  Sig.
Decentralization  -5.51  1.87  *  -20.7  4.48  ***  -9.87  3.32  ***
log GDP per capita  2 73  1.5  *  2.11  1.84  3.1  1.89
log total population  -0.23  0.56  0 99  0.69  0.59  0.74
log population density  0.56  0.69  0.22  0.73  -0.21  0.73
Participation  in VII  6.57  2.57  **  -4.62  3.05  -2.12  2.78
Democracy  score  -1.52  0.27  ***  -2.49  0.33  ***  -2.01  0.31  ***
Institutional  quality  0 92  0 29  ***  1  22  0.3  ***  1.16  0.34
Illiteracy  rate  -0.35  0.06  *  -0.35  0.071  ***  -0.32  0.074  ***
Ethnic tension  -3.63  0.69  ***  -4.04  0.82  ***  -3.96  0.95  ***
Decentralization *
Democracy  1.82  0.63
Decentralization  * Ethnic
tension  4.88  1.78  ***
Key.  =005<p  ￿0  10,  0=  0l  <p 5￿05,  =p ￿001.
The models in Table 2 illustrate these differences  by including an interaction term
for decentralization and the log of per capita GDP. These indicate that the effect of
decentralization  turns negative at a per capita GDP of around $1,400 (in constant  1995
US dollars), somewhat higher than the previously noted crossover point for the
democracy  variable (Gauri and Khaleghian 2002). The models in the third column
modify this approach by using a quadratic  term for the interaction between the log of per
capita GDP-now squared-and the decentralization  variable, following the example of
Robalino, Picazo  and Voetberg (2001). The significance of this variable suggests an L-
shaped relationship between the effect of decentralization on immunization  coverage and
national  income:  a positive relationship in low-income countries, a negative relationship
in middle-income countries,  and a stabilization of this negative relationship as income
rises. Figure 1 illustrates this graphically.
21Table 4. Regression  results, low-income countries
DTP3, basic regression  Aid term and interaction, DTP3
N  331  331
R 2 0.6568  0 6612
Coefficient  SE  Sig.  Coefficient  SE  Sig.
Decentralization  8.81  2.49  *8  12.96  3.41
log GDP per capita  -4.34  2.18  4*  -2 83  2.42
log total population  -3.74  0 68  44  -3 28  0.87
log population density  6.13  0.87  *  6.147  0.87
Participation  in VII  15.92  4.21  *  16.56  4.24
Democracy score  1.97  0 29  t  1.9  0.29
Institutional quality  1.85  0.33  *  1 69  0.34
Illiteracy rate  -0.49  0.05  '*8  -0.49  0.048  *4
Ethnic tension  -1.4  0.82  *  -1.41  0.83  *
Aid per GNP  016  0.07
Decentralization  * Aid/GNP  -0.51  0.2
Measles, basic regression  Aid term and interaction, measles
N  324  324
R 2 0.5749  0.5817
Coefficient  SE  Sig.  Coefficient  SE  Sig.
Decentralization  8.27  2.61  t  11.65  3 71
log GDP per capita  -6.54  2.27  "t  -5.23  2.47
log total population  -I  99  0 65  t  -1.57  0 81
log population density  3.73  0.94  8  3.76  0.94
Participation in VIl  17 29  4.12  t  17 79  4.15
Democracy  score  1.37  0.33  *  1.32  0.32
Institutional  quality  1.62  0.36  'e'  1.49  0.37
Illiteracy rate  -0.38  0.06  t  -0.38  0.06
Ethnic tension  -3.99  0.86  ***  -3.98  0.87
Aid per GNP  0.14  0.07
Decentralization  *  Aid/GNP  -0.4  0 2
Key  * = 0 05 <p SO  10, **  = 0.01 <p  0  05, ** =p  SO 01
Table 5. Mean DTP3 and measles coverage,  by income level and decentralization  status
DTP3, %  Income level
Low  Lower-middle  Upper-muddle
Centralized  54.1  70.4  82.4
Decentralized  67 5  70.8  81  8
Measles, %  Income  level
Low  Lower-middle  Upper-middle
Centralized  55.7  71.5  77.9
Decentralized  65.5  70.8  67.6
Income level cutoffs  $965, $3,000  and $9,400 in  constant  1995 U.S  dollars
22Table 6. DPI data vs. additional data on  decentralization status
Combined  data set,  DPT3  DPI data, DPT3  Additional data, DPT3*
N  707  370  337
R  2  0 5944  0 6456  0 6697
Sig
Coeff  SE  Sig.  Coeff  SE  Sig.  Coeff.  SE
Decentralization  16  4.3  ***  24.59  12.1  **  4.17  6.29
logGDPpercapita  4.42  1.2  ***  11.42  2  ***  6.02  2.01  *
log total population  -0.67  0.5  1  31  0 66  **  -2 66  0.85  *
log population density  3.49  0.55  *  1 98  0 69  ***  5 39  0.84  ***
Participation  in VII  12.43  2.82  ***  10.68  2 94  ***  -2.45  5.31
Democracy  score  4.28  0.54  ***  7 48  1 51  ***  2 17  0.73  ***
Institutional  quality  1 4  0.2  ***  0 85  0.27  ***  1.52  0.29
Illiteracy rate  -0.42  0.04  ***  -0.03  0.1  -0.58  0 04
Ethnic tension  -3 46  1 12  ***  -9 92  2.69  *  -2.24  1.46
Democracy * log GDP  -2.7  0.33  ***  -3.95  0.8  *  -0.69  0.51
Decentralization  * log GDP  -9.7  2.57  ***  -16.92  6.18  ***  0.96  4.6
Ethnic tension * log GDP  1.48  0.65  ***  4 31  1.38  ***  0.61  1.06
Aid per capita * log GDP  0.26  0.06  ***  0.24  0.09  ***  0  14  0.07  *
Combined, measles  DPI data, measles  Additional  data, measles*
N  689  359  330
R  2  0.5855  0.6492  0.6354
Coefficie  Coefficien  Sig
nt  SE  Sig.  Coeff.  SE  Sig.  t  SE
Decentralization  15 53  4 97  *  9  4 65  *  7.93  6.6
logGDPpercapita  363  1 19  ***  I1  207  ***  8  2.14  ***
log total population  0.45  0 48  2.17  0.72  ***  -1.09  0.81
log population density  1  99  0.58  ***  0 89  0 81  2.96  0.93
Participation in VII  11.36  2 5  *  8 54  3.15  ***  -1.31  4.9
Democracy score  2.62  0.58  ***  6.06  1 63  **  1.05  0 78
Institutional quality  1 14  .023  ***  054  031  *  1.51  0.33
Illiteracy rate  -0.31  0.038  ***  -0.005  0.1  -0 44  0.06  ***
Ethnic  tension  -6 53  1.15  ***  -10.29  2.91  ***  -5.81  1.49  ***
Democracy * log GDP  -1  75  0.34  ***  -3.72  0 88  ***  0.18  0.53
Decentralization  * log GDP  -9.94  2.95  ***  -9.67  6.48  -0 12  4.78
Ethnic tension * log GDP  1 89  0.66  ***  3.4  1.45  **  1.61  1.05
Aid per capita * log GDP  0 21  0.06  ***  0.27  0.1  ***  0.1  0.08
Note: The weaker results from the additional data probably  reflect the fact that most of these  data were for non-
decentralized  countnes. That  is, the supplementary data added a majority of "zeroes"  to the data set, and relatively
fewer positive observations.  In the DPI data set, there were 526 observations  (i.e., country-years)  on centralized
countnes and 435 observations on decentralized ones;  m the supplementary  data, these figures were 648 and 66
respectively. The overall  data set included  data on  1174 centralized  and 501  decentralized country-years.
23Figure 1. Independent  effect of decentralization  on immunization coverage, vs. GDP per capita
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What explains this difference  in the effect of decentralization  between low and
middle-income  countries?  In particular,  why do low-income  countries have  such a
strongly positive coefficient  when both theory and reported practice would lead us to
expect the opposite?
Statistical confounding  is one possibility,  whereby the relationship  between
decentralization  and immunization  coverage  in low-income countries  is mediated by a
third factor-not observed-that is simultaneously  correlated with both the decision to
decentralize  and the capacity to obtain high levels of immunization coverage. 30 The
inclusion of numerous control variables  mitigates against this interpretation,  as does the
fact that similar relationships  have been observed for decentralization  and infant
mortality rates by Robalino,  Picazo and Voetberg (2001)  and for democratic  government,
immunization coverage and the adoption of new vaccines  by Gauri and Khaleghian
(2002).3 A related possibility is that decentralized  low-income  countries may have
started with higher coverage rates than their centralized counterparts,  giving them a "head
30 In other words,  a kind of selection bias may be at work here, whereby it isn't decentralization that
leads  low-income  countries to have better coverage  rates, but rather that countries with better rates tend to
be those that decentralize  first.  This is actually a form of confounding,  since  the underlying factor,  i.e., the
variable that causes  some countries to decentralize  and others to not,  is unknown and simultaneously
correlated with both coverage rates and decentralization  status.
31 These results might also have been subject to confounding.  In the case of Robalino, Picazo and
Voetberg (2001), their independent variable,  fiscal  decentralization,  is reasonably  similar to the one we use
here.  Gauri and Kihaleghian's  (2002)  findings on the effect of democratic government might also be related
to ours,  both theoretically  and statistically (if democratic  government and decentralization  are both
motivated by similar underlying factors,  for example).
24start" over these countries and biasing regressions  that use absolute coverage rates as a
dependent variable. To check this, we created a new dependent variable by taking the
difference between a country's first-recorded rate (usually from  1980, but in some cases
from 1981  or 1982) and the observed coverage rate in each subsequent year. No
significant change in the relationship  was observed using this variable, nor was there any
difference when logit-transformed dependent variables  were used.32 The models were
also run for different  subsets of the study period (1980-84,  1985-89,  1990-97) with no
significant change to the results. 33
Assuming the observed difference between  the decentralization  effect  in low and
middle-income  countries not simply a statistical artifact, the question turns to why such  a
difference  exists. Reasons  for the observed relationship in middle-income countries-
where decentralization is associated with lower coverage rates, other things being
equal-have been discussed  already,  in earlier sections of this paper. What is not so clear
is why these effects are not observed in low-income countries, and why these countries'
results are in fact the complete opposite of those predicted by both theoretical accounts
and published reports.
Several explanations  are possible. First, decentralization  in low-income countries
may be associated with a greater retention of central influence than in middle-income
countries, where the demand for local autonomy may be greater and the devolution of
central functions correspondingly more extensive.  This is usually considered a harmiful
design flaw in decentralized  systems,  since it limits the autonomy of local governments
and therefore reduces related benefits such as inter-jurisdictional  competition  and the
production of locally differentiated services. For immunization programs, however, the
"failure"  of a central government  to give up certain essential functions-such  as
monitoring and evaluation,  or disease surveillance-may  actually be a good thing,
especially  in view of the wide range of central activities necessary  to the effective
32 This is not a perfect method, as it doesn't take into account the increasing difficulty of raising
immunization coverage once coverage  rates get above 80 to 90 percent. Thus, while designed to equalize
countries  vis-a-vis their starting point, it may excessively penalize high-achieving countries  and give too
great a benefit to countries starting with very low rates.  A similar effect  is observed when using first
differences, but with even more extreme penalties for high-achieving  countries that make small annual
increments.  This effect is less pronounced in our approach because a single, early baseline is used, rather
than the "moving"  (annual) baseline implicit in using first differences.  Logit transformation-which
linearizes the S-shaped  curve of immunization  time-series and allows the specification  of a "ceiling" rate
(taken here as 95 percent) against which to compare the rates in each country-year-provides  an even
better dependent variable, as described earlier.
33  The observed relationships were robust to a wide variety of changes  in both the data and the
specification  of the model. For low-income  countries, excluding India and Nepal-both of which are
known to over-report immunization coverage-made  no difference to the results.  Neither did removing
India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh together,  all of which had high-leverage  observations. Removing former
Soviet Bloc countries (which are known ceterisparibus  to have obtained higher coverage levels than their
non-Soviet  Bloc counterparts)  also made no appreciable difference  either. (In fact, the strength of the
observed relationship between decentralization  and immunization coverage in low-income  countries  is
made  all the more remarkable by the fact that these countries are included in the centralized  group and
might therefore have been  expected  to bias the results in the opposite direction.)
25functioning of an immunization program and the harmful consequences of decentralizing
these. Low-income countries may also give immunization greater priority among their
health objectives, given their higher prevalence of communicable  diseases,34 and if
decentralized  may transmit this to lower-level  authorities for implementation.
Second,  local authorities  in low-income countries may have greater bureaucratic
autonomy than those in middle-income  countries. This is a two-edged sword. On the one
hand,  it provides local authorities with the influence necessary to coordinate the wide
range of activities involved in a well-functioning  local immunization program, and it
gives them the freedom to innovate and experiment  while doing so; but on the other hand,
it can hinder efforts to improve accountability and limit opportunities for community
members to express their preferences and concerns. If local authorities are instructed by
the center to consider immunization a priority, and if they remain relatively more
responsive to central directives than to community demands,35 then their proximity to the
community and their knowledge  of local circumstances can lead to a significant positive
impact on immunization  coverage. But if they face less central direction, or if they face a
greater diversity (or louder expression) of demands from the local community, then the
impact may be negative,  as seen in middle-income  countries.
Third, low and middle-income countries may differ in the nature and extent of
community participation. In low-income  countries, community mobilization might have  a
more pragmatic character,  with community members being called upon to help in
national  immunization days or other practical  activities rather than being consulted for
their views on the quality of services or their input into resource allocation decisions
(Brinkerhoff 2000). In middle-income countries, by contrast, community involvement  is
likely to focus less on practical  participation in immunization-related activities  and more
on providing input to resource allocation and priority-setting debates. This can be
problematic for immunization,  as discussed earlier, since communities-when  given the
choice-frequently  opt for a focus  on curative services over preventive ones, and may
indeed opt for other, non-health services altogether.  Local authorities in low-income
countries, faced with fewer such demands (either because there are fewer channels  for
expression or because they have sufficient bureaucratic  autonomy to resist them), may
therefore be in a better position to focus on immunization than their middle-income
country counterparts,  and at the same time in a better position to implement
immunization-related  tasks-given their proximity to the community and their greater
autonomy in dealing with it-than their centralized counterparts  in the low-income
group.
34 Also relevant is  the interest of donor nations and development  agencies in controlling these
diseases, as recently re-stated in the Millennium Development Goals and their heavy emphasis on
communicable disease prevention  and control.
35 Even in a decentralized  system,  local  bureaucrats may remain "closer" to their central counterparts
than to local political executives, from whom they may be more distant because of differences  in class,
caste,  professional background and personal allegiances, among other things.
26A fourth possibility concerns  accountability. For reasons that have been discussed
already, immunization  services are seldom the focus of community efforts to hold local
authorities accountable  for the services they provide. But in low-income countries,  where
health services  are among the most visible manifestations of government presence at the
local level, these services may form an important focus of public demands for improved
performance.  While these demands are unlikely to focus on immunization  specifically,
the importance of imrnmunization  among primary health services-and the fact that it is
frequently delivered from the same government facilities as low-level  curative services,
which are the more likely focus of public concern-may result in a positive effect on
immunization programs as well. This is less likely in middle-income  countries, where a
wider range of government services are provided (and where public knowledge of these
programs may be better), and where communities are therefore more likely to hold
officials accountable for other, non-health services-or within health,  for curative
services rather than preventive ones-instead.
Broadly speaking, these results suggest that low-income  countries get the "best"
out of decentralization-as  far as immunization is concerned, at least-while middle-
income countries get the worst. In low-income countries, the positive coefficient may
reflect a salutary balance between the proximity of local authorities to the community
(and related effects such  as their improved knowledge of local circumstances,  their
freedom to adapt services to these conditions, and the local community's  ability to
monitor their performance)  and the preservation of central influence  and bureaucratic
autonomy, both of which are essential to the effective functioning of an immunization
program. In middle-income countries,  the negative coefficient  may reflect the reverse:
namely, a greater devolution of central powers to local authorities,  including
immunization-related  functions  that should remain centrally supervised;  local authorities
with closer links to the community than the center, resulting in a preferential
responsiveness to community demands and a corresponding lack of attention to centrally
determined priorities; a louder and more diverse range of community demands, including
for services  other than immunization;  and less accountability  from the community for
preventive or primary health services as compared with curative services or other, non-
health concerns.36 Differences  in the policy emphasis given to immunization  may also
play a role.
Still, the magnitude of these effects remains striking.  In low-income countries, the
positive effect of decentralization  is approximately  the same, on average,  as that of an 20
percent increase in the literacy  rate, while in middle-income countries,  the effect is
36 By contrast,  the reasons for a positive coefficient  in low-income countries may include a greater
retention of central  influence,  a stronger policy focus on immunization compared to other health services,
local authorities with closer links to the center than the community,  fewer demands  from the community  (or
fewer channels  to express them), and more accountability  from the community for immunization  services
because of their connection  to primary health care and the visibility and importance  of these services to the
community  at large-unless it is just a self-selection bias (i.e.,  something correlated with  low-income
countries'  choice to decentralize  in the first place),  which it might well be.
27equivalent to that of a 15 percent decrease in this rate. Other comparisons can be made
using the coefficients on Tables 3 and 4.
2.  In middle-income countries, democratic government  mitigates the negative effect of
decentralization; but surprisingly, institutional  quality does not.
In middle-income  countries, decentralization  and democratic government  are both
associated with lower immunization coverage  rates. For a typical middle-income  country,
a one-point increase in the democracy variable  (on a scale from zero to ten) is associated
with a 2.3 percent decrease in DTP3 coverage  [1.7, 2.9] and a 2.5 percent decrease  in
measles coverage [1.8, 3.1], other things being equal  (Table 3). This result has been
discussed elsewhere (Gauri and Khaleghian 2002) and is not reviewed in detail here.
Unexpectedly,  however, the coefficient on the interaction  term between democracy and
decentralization  is positive. This can be interpreted  in two ways: either that democracy
mitigates the negative effects of decentralization,  or vice versa.
The first interpretation, that democracy mitigates the negative effects of
decentralization,  goes against theoretical expectations about the impact of community
participation  in middle-income  countries. If democracy gives a louder voice  to
community preferences, and if these preferences are for goods and services other than
immunization, then we might expect immunization to be "crowded out" of the agenda of
local governments  and a negative relationship to ensue. This would correspond to a
negative sign on the interaction term for democracy and decentralization,  which is the
reverse of what we observe.  But if democratic  government stimulates  a higher level of
government accountability overall, and if this accountability  improves the performance  of
the government's  functioning as a whole,  then this improvement might be more visible in
decentralized  countries-where  opportunities  exist for local as well as central
accountability-and  immunization may benefit as an indirect result.
The second interpretation, that decentralization  mitigates the negative effects of
democracy, may reflect differences in the democratic process between centralized and
decentralized countries.37 Democracy without decentralization may strengthen the
influence of national-level elites who typically have little interest in preventive health
care, with negative implications for services  such as immunization.38 Decentralization
can mitigate this by facilitating a broader range of inputs to the democratic process-
including those of rural or poor constituencies,  for example-and  in turn can elevate the
position of immunization  (or, more probably, primary health services  in general)  on the
policy agenda.
In either case, the magnitude of the interaction effect is relatively small, and even
under the most favorable of circumstances it continues to be dominated by the
37 See Manor (1999) for fiurther discussion.
38 In these countries, political participation  takes place only at the central level, and local officials
(where  they exist) are simply the field functionaries of deconcentrated central agencies. Examples of
centralized countries  with high democracy  scores include Costa Rica, Greece, Hungary after  1990,
Lithuania after  1991, and Mongolia after 1992.
28independent (and negative) effects of decentralization and democracy themselves.
Separately,  decentralization  and democracy are associated with  15.9 and (a maximum)
23.2 percent reductions in DTP3 rates respectively,  for a total difference of 39.1  percent
between decentralized,  democratic  countries and centralized,  autocratic  ones. Adding the
interaction term reduces this significantly,  to 25.6 percent, but the overall relationship
remains negative.39 No such effects are observed in low-income countries, in which
democracy and decentralization  are both independently associated with higher coverage
rates but no interaction exists.
The non-significance of an interaction term for decentralization  and institutional
quality is harder to explain.40 Given the importance of management capacity as a
determinant of local government functioning  in decentralized systems, one would a priori
expect a positive and significant coefficient on this variable.4'  No such effect is observed.
The variable for institutional quality-a composite of various deterrninants of
government functioning,  and used here as a proxy for the quality of governance-does
have an highly positive effect on coverage rates, with approximately  the same magnitude
in low and middle-income  countries. But this effect is the same in both centralized and
decentralized  settings, suggesting that the effectiveness  of decentralization  may rely less
on administrative quality,  as highlighted in numerous case studies, and more on other
issues (such as the division of central-local responsibilities,  or the extent to which these
services are protected by central mandates and tied funds) instead. This can only be a
tentative conclusion,  since both intuitive  logic and published reports  support a strong role
for management  capacity as a determinant of good functioning in decentralized  systems.
39 Removing former Soviet Bloc countries from the analysis did not change these results.
40 Separate regressions (not shown) looked specifically  at the influence of corruption on immunization
coverage rates. Not surprisingly, a simple model predicting DTP3 coverage as a function of corruption
found  a strong relationship between the two, with corruption by itself explaining  17 percent of the variance
in coverage rates. However,  the corruption effect was not robust to the inclusion of control variables for
income, democracy and institutional quality-here constructed without the corruption variable, with which
it was not strongly correlated-and  it did not appear to modify the relationship  between decentralization
and immunization coverage when included as an interaction term with the former.  Both these findings  are
counterintuitive. The first runs counter to empirical studies of other public services,  in which the
independent effect of corruption generally remains significant even in the presence of other control
variables.  The second suggests that corruption does not modify the effectiveness of decentralization-or
alternatively,  that decentralization  does not modify the effect of corruption-and  therefore contradicts the
findings of Fisman and Gatti (2000). In both cases, the explanation  may lie in the low rent-extraction
potential of immunization programs as compared with other government services.  To illustrate:  In a typical
developing-country  immunization program, vaccines and supplies are bought at the central level, often with
donor funds or through international procurement schemes with stringent transparency requirements. These
vaccines and supplies are then distributed to states, provinces, districts or even clinics, and are paid for with
budgetary transfers at the central  level.  They are then used by health workers who deliver them in clinics or
outreach programs for which (usually) no fees are charged. The opportunities  for corruption in this kind of
system  are therefore quite limited, especially  by contrast to other public services-such as pharmaceutical
purchases or public works, for example-where  financial transactions are more abundant or public demand
is greater.
41  In other words,  that institutional quality would  mitigate decentralization's negative effect in middle-
income countries, and would reinforce its positive effect in low-income ones.
293.  In middle-income  countries,  decentralization  reverses the negative effects  of ethnic
tension and ethnolinguistic fractionalizatlon.
Other things being equal, ethnic tension and ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  are
both associated with lower coverage rates for DTP3  and measles in middle-income
countries (Table 3).  A one-point  increase in ethnic tension (measured  on a six-point
scale)  is associated with a 4.5 percent reduction in DTP3  coverage  [2.7, 6.4], and a one
percent increase in ELF is associated with a 2.3 percent reduction in coverage  [1.6, 3.0].42
What is more interesting, however, is that the interaction term for decentralization  and
ethnic tension (and a similar term using ELF instead of ethnic tension) has a positive
coefficient.43 Significantly, the coefficient  is actually larger in magnitude than the
(negative)  coefficients  on the ethnic tension and ELF variables  alone, suggesting that
decentralization  not only mitigates the negative effects of ethnic tension and
heterogeneity but actually reverses them. In other words, while ethnic tension and ELF
are associated with lower coverage in centralized countries, they are actually associated
with higher coverage in decentralized  ones.
Centralization is therefore associated with a substantial advantage in countries
with little or no ethnic heterogeneity or tension, but the advantage disappears-and
becomes  dominated by the positive effects of decentralization-once  the ELF index
reaches 0.57 or the level of ethnic tension reaches 3.1.
What explains these effects? By themselves, ethnic tension and heterogeneity can
inhibit the development of strong national institutions  and may divert government
attention away from essential services (such as immunization)  and toward the various
exigencies of maintaining stability in a fractionalized  environment (La Porta and others
1999). They can also pose difficulties for immunization programs,  in which the need to
communicate  across ethnic and linguistic lines may compromise  the ability of health
workers to reach the entire population with essential vaccines.  Decentralization can help
address these problems in three ways. First, by distributing more widely the task of
dealing with ethnic heterogeneity and the demands and tensions to which it gives rise,44  it
can allow the central government to focus on essential tasks (such  as immunization)  that
might otherwise be dominated by the conflicting demands of different groups.  Second, by
moving the government "closer"  to the community-and thus to the various ethnic or
linguistic groups that compose it-it can strengthen the government's  ability to respond
to the diverse needs of these groups, thus potentially reducing  such tensions. And third,
42 Results for ELF are not shown  in Table 3 as they very closely followed those of the variable for
ethnic tension.
43 The correlation coefficient  for ethnic tension and ethnolinguistic fractionalization  is 0.48,
suggesting that the two variables are measuring different but related phenomena.  The example of Albania
illustrates this point: with an ELF of 0.09, it is among the least ethnolinguistically  diverse countries  in the
world; yet its ethnic tension score is 3.9, reflecting the extent of tensions between  the few ethnically distinct
groups that do exist. No significant  difference was observed  when using Roeder's (2001) updated ELF data
for 1985 as compared with the original data of Taylor and Hudson (1972). The correlation between these
two measures was R = 0.94.
44 That is, by spreading  the responsibility for governance across a larger number of units.
30also by moving the government  closer to the community,  it can improve the perfornance
of certain services-especially  those for which tastes and preferences vary widely across
groups, or for which local  adaptation is important for other reasons-by enabling
decentralized  authorities to tailor them to varied local circumstances.
Immunization,  as currently practiced in most countries, is a supply-driven
technical intervention for which demand is limited, and it therefore seems an improbable
candidate to benefit from the third of these effects.  It can, however, be strengthened by
the ability to tailor programs and materials locally, and these in turn can improve its
ability to reach marginalized ethnic or linguistic groups (and thus increase immunization
coverage),45 so part of the observed effect-i.e.,  that decentralization  has a less negative
effect in ethnically or linguistically heterogeneous countries-may reflect these benefits.
This finding is consistent with the theoretical expectations  summarized earlier.46
Curiously, however,  these results are only observed for DTP3 and not for the
measles vaccine. This may reflect differences in the mode of delivery for these vaccines.
DTP3, being the last of three sequentially  administered vaccines,  relies more heavily on
routine health services for its delivery (and therefore provides a better reflection of how
these services function) than measles, which as a single-dose  vaccine can also be (and is
often) administered during national immunization days and other "one off' activities
outside the routine health delivery system.
4.  In low-income  countries, development  assistance is associated  with a reduction in
immunization  coverage in decentralized  countries, but an increase in coverage  in
centralized ones.
Development assistance is associated with higher coverage rates for both DTP3
and measles in low-income countries (Table 4). This is in line with intuitive expectations
about the role and impact of development assistance, and it may reflect technical
cooperation  and enhanced professional exchange as much as direct financial assistance
per  se. Surprisingly, however,  the coefficient  on the interaction between development aid
and decentralization  is strongly negative.  Thus, in decentralized  countries,  an increased
level of development  aid per capita is associated with a reduction in coverage rates, other
things being equal, whereas in centralized countries the association  is with an increase  in
these rates. The effect is not large, and the positive impact of decentralization  continues
to dominate up to aid levels of around 38 percent of GDP; but at more moderate levels-
45 Another factor is the increased geographic  reach engendered  by decentralization,  though this does
not always happen automatically and can be a characteristic of non-autonomous deconcentrated  field
administrations  as well.
46 If a government chooses to decentralize as a result of ethnic  tension or heterogeneity,  then using
both variables in the same regression  would result in biased estimates due to the correlation between  them
This is a genuine concern  in principle,  since many authors have pointed to decentralization  as a way of
dispersing ethnic conflict or preventing political unrest among marginalized  ethnic or linguistic groups
(Collins and Green  1994; Manor  1999). In practice, however,  the correlation  between the ethnic tension
and decentralization variables  in our data was small, with an R of -0.21.  The correlation between ELF and
decentralization  was even smaller,  with an R of -0.12.  Collinearity was ruled out by obtaining variance
inflation factors after each regression.
31aid levels of between 5 and  10 percent of GDP, for example-the positive relationship
between decentralization  and immunization coverage can be reduced (in relative terms)
by 14 to 27 percent, other things being equal. (Even at these levels, however,
decentralized countries do better than centralized ones. This effect reverses above aid
levels of around 25 percent of GDP.) 47
Several explanations  are possible. In most countries, especially low-income  ones,
development assistance  is channeled principally through central government institutions
and less through local governments or community groups. This can be problematic  in
decentralized  settings, since it reinforces  a centralized approach and can undermine the
decentralization  process (Dollar and Pritchett  1998, p.86); and it can be especially
problematic  for immunization,  in which decentralization  is already complicated by the
vertical design of most immunization programs and the historical tendency of donors to
perpetuate this approach.  From this perspective, the observed relationship in
decentralized  countries may reflect tensions between countries'  decentralization
processes and the centralizing tendency of donors,  in which the benefits of
decentralization prevail overall but are reduced when donors get involved.  The observed
relationship in centralized countries may reflect the opposite,  i.e.,  a concurrence between
donor and country approaches,  both of them centralized and vertical. Another possibility
is that donor involvement decreases  the extent of community participation and therefore
reduces the benefits of decentralization.  Published reports from the period between  1980
and 1997 highlight the reluctance of many donor agencies to involve communities  in
their projects and activities  (Dollar and Pritchett  1998). This has been especially true of
some immunization-related activities, as discussed earlier (UNICEF  1996).48
A logical extension of these arguments is that measures of immunization-specific
donor aid should have similar or stronger effects than measures of development  aid in
general. Surprisingly,  however, this result was not found when using variables for
participation in UNICEF's Vaccine Independence Initiative (VII) or PAHO's Revolving
Fund, neither of which changed the effect of the decentralization  variable.  This may
reflect the procurement-specific  assistance provided by these programs, the benefits of
which are principally related to the price and supply of vaccines rather than to
programmatic factors affecting organizational  arrangements that might interact with
decentralization.  A different result might have been obtained with variables  for
4 7 The coefficients do not change significantly whether one measures development aid as a proportion
of GNP, as we do in Table 4, or in per capita terms.
48 Other explanations  seem less plausible. Donors have  actively promoted immunization programs in
all countries,  and a difference  in the emphasis given to these programs in decentralized vs. centralized
countries seems unlikely. It is also doubtful that donors have promoted an excessive devolution  of
immunization-related  activities,  especially given their history of promoting vertical programs and their own
vertically organized structures.  Thus, an interpretation based on practical tensions between  centralization
and decentralization-in  which donor involvement reduces the benefits of decentralization because of
donors  agencies'  own centralizing  tendencies-seems more likely, as does the possible impact of donor
involvement on community participation.
32immunization-related  financial  or technical assistance, but neither of these were available
for the present study.49
5.  Similar results are obtained for fiscal decentralization.
Data on fiscal decentralization  illustrate one aspect of the decentralization
process: namely,  the extent to which government expenditure  takes place at the
subnational level. The relationship between these data and the autonomy of local
governnents remains ambiguous, as discussed earlier and summarized in Ebel and
Yilmaz (2002), and they exclude related (and important) issues such as the taxing and
regulatory power of subnational authorities. For our purposes, data on subnational
expenditures-and  on the proportion of these expenditures allocated to health-were
used to cross-check  the basic findings reported above. The results for DTP3  are shown in
Table 7. Similar results were obtained for the measles vaccine.  The magnitude and
direction of coefficients on the variables for fiscal decentralization  are broadly similar to
those obtained with our binary variable for decentralization.  Interaction  terms using these
variables and measures of national income also gave broadly similar results, though the
income level at which the coefficient  for decentralization  turned negative was higher, at
around $4,400 compared with $1,400 for the regressions in Table 2.
Table 7. Alternative measures:  fiscal decentralization  and decentralized health expenditure vs. the
dichotomous  variable
Dichotomous variable
for decentralization  Subnational expenditure,  Subnational  expenditure,
status  total (SNE)  health as a share of (SNH)
N  719  998  998
R2  0.5893  0.5898  0.5865
Coeff.  SE  Sig.  Coeff.  SE  Sig.  Coeff.  SE  Sig.
Dichotomous/SNE/SNH  12.6  4.19  *  0.88  0.21  **  0.84  0.7
logGDPpercapita  3.63  1.05  **  5.17  0.78  ***  5.13  0.75  ***
log total population  -1.77  0.44  ***  -2.04  0.41  ***  -1.72  0.35  ***
log population density  3.3  0.56  2 81  0.44  **  2.85  0.43  ***
Participation  in VII  12.75  2.8  *'  11.56  2.87  ***  10.97  2.77  ***
Democracy  score  4.38  0.5  ***  4.03  0.47  *""  4.48  0.44  ***
Institutional quahty  1  49  0.19  ***  1.28  0.16  *  1.31  0 16  ***
Illteracy rate  -0  43  0.04  ***  -0.39  0.03  ***  -0.39  0.03  ***
Ethnic tension  -1.44  0.48  **  -1.14  0.35  '*'  -0.97  0.35  *
Democracy * log GDP  -2.82  0.3  ***  -2.74  0.25  *  -2.96  0.24  ***
Dichotomous/SNE/SNH  * log GDP  -7.62  2.51  ***  -0 11  0.03  ***  -0.  1  0.09
Key  0=05<p 510,**=O.Ol<p ￿O05,***=p  !001
6.  Several expected  relationships are not observed.
Several variables were found to be consistently insignificant in estimations  for
both low and middle-income  countries.  A few of these are worth mentioning specifically.
49 Data on donor financing  of immunization programs is currently being compiled by the World
Health  Organization for around 30 countries.  This might provide a better indicator of technical assistance
than measures of procurement support alone. For the present study, WHO provided data on whether or not
there was a WHO staff member dedicated to immunization in each country office. Given the possible
endogeneity of this measure with immunization coverage, for example if WHO staff members are
selectively placed in countries with low coverage, we elected not to use this variable as a measure of donor
support.
33Literacy rates, while significant by themselves, did not seem to modify the effect of
decentralization when included as an interaction term. Hypothetically,  a literate
population might be in a better position to hold local officials  accountable  for the services
they administer, which in turn would make for a favorable interaction between
decentralization  and literacy rates. On the other hand, a more literate population might be
equally liable to demand services other than immunization,  especially in a decentralized
setting,  in which case the effect of literacy on immunization might be neutral or even
negative.  The non-significance  of the interaction between literacy and decentralization
may reflect the combined effect of these two countervailing tendencies, or alternatively
the presence of no interaction  effect whatsoever.
Indicators of access to communication technologies-radios,  televisions,
newspapers and telephones-were  also not significant in most estimations. A priori,  one
might speculate a positive relationship between access to these technologies and
immunization coverage rates, perhaps through channels such as improved penetration of
health-related messages or a closer identification  with modernity and its associated
practices (Caldwell,  Reddy and Caldwell  1983, Caldwell  1986, Gauri and Khaleghian
2002). One might also speculate a positive interaction with decentralization,  for example
by improving public access to information  on local government performance (and thus
improving accountability)  or by providing local authorities with additional channels to
disseminate  and receive information about  services they administer.  Our results provide
little support for either hypothesis. Only one measure-a variable for the extensiveness of
the telephone network-was significant, and this only in low-income countries; and even
in estimations where the telephones variable was positive, the interaction  term for
decentralization  and this variable was not. Measures of televisions,  radios and
newspapers  were all negative. 50
Finally, a measure of income  inequality was found not to be significant in any of
our regressions.  Since decentralization  can exacerbate  inequality (Prud'homme  1995,
McLure  1995, Litvack, Ahmed, and Bird 1998), and since non-immunized  children tend
to be disproportionately  from poorer households (Gwatkin and others 2000), it is possible
that the observed relationships between decentralization and immunization  coverage are
mediated-at  least in part-by the former's impact on equity. If this were the case, then
adjusting for income inequality would change these relationships. No such effect was
observed,  and neither did the inequality variable explain differences  in immunization
coverage  itself to any great extent. This may have been a data effect, since the number of
observations was small; but even in regressions with the low and middle-income  country
data combined (n=149),  no significant effect was observed.
50 Using a variable for press freedom rather than the availability of communications media might have
provided different results.
349.  Conclusions
Decentralization  is not without its benefits.  While empirical  support may be
limited, there are numerous theoretical and common-sense reasons to expect a positive
relationship between decentralization  and various aspects of government performance.
One thing is clear, however:  decentralization,  for all its benefits, is not a panacea. Given
proper design and the right environment,  decentralization can be an effective  reform that
meets many of its theoretical  expectations.  Absent these conditions, however-and many
of them are  absent in developing countries, whether low or middle income-and
decentralization  can easily fail. An important challenge for decentralization  research will
be to identify the institutional  correlates  of successful decentralization,  following the
example of Azfar, Kahkonen,  and Meagher (2001)  in their case studies of Uganda and the
Philippines. We offer several observations  in this direction, based on results from the
present study.
The effects of decentralization  seem to be different in low and middle-income
countries.  Not only do we find a different direction to the relationship between
decentralization  and immunization  coverage in different income groups-positive in low-
income countries,  negative in middle-income  ones-we also find evidence  of different
pathways  for these effects in each. While firm conclusions can not be drawn from an
aggregated cross-sectional study such as this, we speculate that the overall  difference
between low and middle-income  countries reflects differences  in two relationships:
between central and local authorities on the one hand, and between local authorities and
the communities they serve on the other. The first relationship has been well examined in
the decentralization  literature but is seldom given the same attention in practice.
Decentralization  does not imply a diminution  in the role and responsibilities of central
government;  instead,  it calls for a reorientation of the central government's role, away
from one of direct supervision and toward one of environment-setting  and general
oversight. Yet in practice, decentralizing reforms  are often accompanied by substantial
curtailments in the roles, responsibilities  and resources of the central government,  and
some services-especially  those with public good aspects and inter-jurisdictional
externalities  such as immunization,  which even the theoretical  literature suggests need
"protection" in decentralized settings-are  harmed as a result. Tendler and Freedheim's
(1994) classic article on public health services in the state of Ceara,  Brazil, emphasized
the role of the "central  in the decentralized"  as a key reason for Ceara's success in
decentralization.  We draw a similar conclusion here. This does not imply a need for over-
centralizing immunization programs,  as advocated by proponents of vertical models.
Instead, it implies that central public health authorities in decentralized  settings should re-
orient themselves  to an oversight role, and should play closer attention to incentives and
sanctions for local authorities rather than holding on to a parallel cadre of dedicated
immunization staff. For most immunization programs, this will require a major shift in
administrative thought and practice. Feilden and Nielson's (2001) manual provides an
excellent place to start, but the process will also require considerable experimentation,
since experience  is limited.
35The second relationship, between local authorities and the communities they
serve,  is also an important aspect of the decentralization  process. Many of the proposed
benefits of decentralization  are based on a closer relationship between local governments
and local communities,  and on the information and accountability benefits that are
supposed to ensue. This is not true of all public services, however.  There is considerable
evidence that, when given the choice, communities prefer to focus the attention and
resources of their local governments  on services other than health, or on curative  health
services rather than preventive ones. Local governments  are also prone to "capture" by
local elites whose health service preferences  are typically for curative  care. This leaves
preventive  programs such as immunization in a bind. On the one hand, they seek to gain
the benefits of decentralization and community involvement  vis-ai-vis accountability and
local information.  But on the other hand, they can be adversely affected by local political
economy issues and by community members' preferences  for other types of service.  This
is not an easy question to resolve.  We speculate that the former pattern dominates  in low-
income countries, with the benefits outweighing  the costs, and that the latter pattern
becomes increasingly dominant as incomes rise. This suggests that policies to stimulate
community involvement  in low-income countries should continue to be general,  i.e.,  to
promote community engagement  in a wide span of issues related to public service
provision, but that efforts to stimulate  community involvement  in middle-income
countries should be more service-specific  in nature. Models  such as the Bamako Initiative
have been successful  in low-income countries in spite of wide span of health services
which they cover. In middle-income  countries, however, we speculate that similar
initiatives-even  if specific to the health sector, and possibly even to primary care as a
whole-would impair immunization programs by reflecting the community's increasing
preference for curative care, pharmaceuticals  and hospital-based  services  over
prevention. We therefore propose a community engagement strategy for middle-income
countries that is based on specific support for immunization, such  as by supporting  civil
society involvement in immunization-related activities and engaging in constituency
building activities that are specific to immunization.  These capacities are weakly
developed in most middle-income  countries, so considerable  experimentation will be
necessary  in this area also.
Several  other observations are also worth mentioning in summary. First,
institutional capacity does not seem to modify the relationship between  decentralization
and immunization coverage.  This is something of a surprise.  The  literature  on
decentralization  emphasizes the importance of institutional capacity at all levels. In our
study, however, apart from its independent effect on immunization coverage (which is
large), there  is no evidence that institutional capacity makes  decentralization any more or
less effective.  This runs contrary to prior expectations  and raises the possibility that
design issues-such as those concerned with central-local  relationships  and patterns of
community participation-play a larger role than institutional capacity per  se. This
remains speculative, however.  Second, donors seem to be less effective in decentralized
settings, as evidenced by their negative impact on immunization coverage in
36decentralized  countries and theirpositive impact (as would be expected) in centralized
ones. The preference of donor agencies for vertical and centralized projects has been
well-documented,  especially when it comes to immunization, and may explain this effect
to some extent. Also relevant  is the additional  complexity of donor operations in
decentralized contexts,  some of which is due to reluctance  on the part of central
governments to permit direct relationships between donors and sub-national governments
and some of which arises because of donors' historical tendency to deal with central
governments alone (Khaleghian 2002). Whatever the reasons, our findings highlight the
need for donors to improve the quality of their engagement in decentralized  settings.
Third, we confirm theoretical expectations  regarding the positive effect of
decentralization in conditions of ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity,  at least in middle-
income countries.
Much work remains to better understand the impact of decentralization  on
government performance  and public service delivery. Recent case studies have begun the
difficult but important task of collecting micro-level  information on the determinants of
good and bad performance in decentralization,  and macro-level  studies (of which there
are still very few) have begun to make  a contribution as well. While mrany
methodological questions remain-central  among them the key political economy
question of why some countries choose to decentralize in the first place-an emerging
conclusion from all these studies is that not all public services are alike in their response
to decentralizing reforms. While some services respond well, others respond poorly.  A
fruitful area of future research may be to differentiate  services according to their
response,  and to formulate policy guidelines to protect those that do poorly under
conditions of decentralized  governance.  Immunization,  especially among middle-income
countries, falls into the latter category,  and should be safeguarded from these adverse
effects.
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